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In the Absence of Title: Responding to
Federal Ownership in Sacred Sites Cases
Kristen A. Carpenter*
This paper examines the challenge of protecting American Indian sacred
sites located on federal public lands. Many have addressed this issue in the
religious freedoms context,' but I believe the problem is just as much about
property law. The Supreme Court's decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, for example, would appear to suggest that
federal ownership of certain sacred sites trumps tribal free exercise clause
claims regarding those sites. 2 This holding corresponds with a classic
model in which "[p]roperty is about rights over things and the people who
have those rights are called owners." 3 However, a closer look at property
law reveals that "ownership" is only one factor in any analysis, and
property also encompasses interests, obligations, and values beyond the
narrow question of owners' rights.4 Here I argue that recognizing the
expansiveness of property law can be a useful tool in developing legal
arguments that respond to the ownership bar presented by Lyng.
5
* Assistant Professor, Suffolk University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School
(1998); A.B., Dartmouth College (1994). This paper was originally delivered at the New
England Law Review symposium entitled The Role of Jurisdiction in the Quest for
Sovereignty held on October 25, 2002. The author wishes to thank Lorie M. Graham,
Angela R. Riley, and Joseph William Singer for their helpful comments, and the editors and
staff of the New England Law Review for their work on this piece.
. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., Sacred Lands and Religious Freedom, in FOR THIS
LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA 203-13 (1998). See generally Scott Hardt, The
Sacred Public Lands. Improper Line Drawing in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Analysis, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 601 (1989).
2. See 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
3. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 2 (2000) [hereinafter, "ENTITLEMENT"].
4. See id. at 6-18.
5. This paper is meant only to provide an initial introduction to the use of certain
property law arguments in sacred sites cases. The ideas discussed here will be developed
and substantiated in a subsequent piece. This paper does not address the several federal
statutes that may also be helpful to tribes in sacred sites cases; these statutes have been
discussed in a number of articles. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Sacred Sites and Religious
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SACRED PLACES AND FEDERAL OWNERSHIP
Most American Indian cultures and religions are deeply connected to
certain places in the natural world. These "sacred sites" include Sweet
Grass Hills in Northern Montana, Devils Tower in Wyoming, the Black
Hills of South Dakota, and hundreds or thousands of other places that have
religious and cultural significance for Indian peoples. 6 Many sacred sites
figure prominently in tribal oral traditions; some mark the place of creation,
while others have more recent historical significance.7 These sites maintain
their significance today, and Indians visit them to hold ceremonies and
engage in other activities that are crucial to community vitality. For
example, in litigation involving Devils Tower, known to Lakota peoples as
Mato Tipila or Bear's Lodge, Cheyenne River Sioux practitioners
explained:
[The sun dances, vision quests, and other spiritual practices that occur at
Devils Tower] are: "vital to the health of our nation and to our self-
determination as a Tribe. Those who use the butte to pray become
stronger. They gain sacred knowledge from the spirits that helps us to
preserve our Lakota culture and way of life. They become leaders.
Without their knowledge and leadership, we cannot continue to
determine our destiny."8
Today, however, Indian nations' ability to maintain their relationship
with these sacred sites is threatened. As a result of European conquest and
American colonization, Indian nations lost most of their traditional
territories, 9 and today, former Indian lands are owned by private
Freedom on Government Land, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 241, 255-56 (2003) (analyzing the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act and other laws); Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining
Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 413, 438-
58 (2002) (discussing the Archeological Resources Protection Act, Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, and other federal statutes).
6. Compare ANDREW GUILFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING
TRIBAL TRADITIONS 67-176 (2000), with Thomas F. King, "Sacred Sites" Protection: Be
Careful What You Ask For, May 28, 2002 (arguing that the term "sacred sites" fails to
encompass all of the land and resources that are spiritually signficant to Indian peoples), at
http://www.sacredland.org/thomas-king.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
7. See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 272-82 (1992).
8. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Intervenors, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe).
9. Chief Justice John Marshall held in 1823 that Indian nations possessed original
Indian title to their lands, and that the federal government held the sole and exclusive right
to acquire their title "by purchase or by conquest." Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 587 (1823). See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (discussing the origins of
the doctrine of discovery and other legal doctrines that Europeans and Americans used to
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individuals, companies, governments, and others.10 This paper focuses on
lands owned by the federal government and the conflicts that arise when
the government wants to use the land in a way that would desecrate a
sacred site or prevent Indian access to it.
THE OWNERSHIP BAR
The federal government holds over six hundred million acres of land in
fee simple title, includin national parks and forests, monuments, historic
sites, and grazing lands. Even though these lands are now owned and
managed by the federal government, American Indians continue to visit
sacred sites located on public lands and practice their religions to the extent
possible. 12 But their ability to do so is hampered by some federal land
management practices, including the development of timber, oil and gas
resources, the construction of dams and roads, and the facilitation of
commercial recreation and tourism. These, and other federal land use
justify the dispossession of Indian lands). See also Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation,
Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV.
453, 458 (1994) (stating that "although land transfers did result from armed conflicts with
Indian tribes, much more land was acquired through treaties negotiated with Indian tribes").
See also Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in
American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481, 486-503 (1994) (discussing the legal
extinguishment of original Indian title).
10. American Indians tribes and individuals, who originally owned 100% of the
present-day United States, now own only 4.2% of the land in the United States. See DAVID
H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 21 (4th ed. 1998)
(citing figures from 1996).
11. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC LAND
LAW 1 (2d ed. 2001). In this paper I focus on the government as the "owner" of federal
public lands, but I recognize it also acts as a "sovereign" over these lands. See Light v.
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911). See also James L. Huffman, The Inevitability
Of Private Rights In Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 241, 255-56 (1994) (on whether the
government's dominion over public lands is best described through an ownership or
sovereignty model, and whether it is the government or the citizens who are the proprietors
of the land). Indian tribes, too, are both sovereigns and owners, although in some cases
courts have failed to recognize the duality. See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and
Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1991). The ramifications of the property/sovereignty
tension will be considered in a subsequent article.
12. The story of how the federal government came to "own" vast tracts of "public
lands" is closely linked to American Indian history, as described in several books focusing
on the National Parks System. See, e.g., PHILIP BURNHAM, INDIAN COUNTRY, GOD'S
COUNTRY: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE NATIONAL PARKS (2000); ROBERT H. KELLER &
MICHAEL F. TUREK, AMERICAN INDIANS AND NATIONAL PARKS (1998); MARK DAVID
SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS: INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE MAKING OF THE
NATIONAL PARKS (1999). Of course the government's ownership and management of public
lands involves issues beyond Indian sacred sites that are not treated in this paper.
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projects and programs, can threaten the physical integrity of sacred sites, as
well as the quiet and privacy that American Indians require for religious
and cultural practices.
In recent decades, tribal people brought several lawsuits challenging
federal development projects on grounds that they would infringe on the
Indians' freedom of religion in violation of the First Amendment. 13 In
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, for example, the Eastern Band of
Cherokees tried to stop the construction of the Tellico Dam on property
owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority, an agency of the federal
government. 14 The Cherokees claimed the project would flood historic
Cherokee towns, destroying sacred sites, medicine gathering places, graves,
and deadening the Tennessee River itself.15 The Cherokees further argued
that the proposed project would impose a substantial infringement on their
religion and that, as a result, the government was required to demonstrate a
compelling interest in the project and that no alternative could satisfy the
government objective. 16
Similar suits followed. In Badoni v. Higginson,17 Navajo medicine
people and others argued that federal management of Rainbow Bridge
National Monument was drowning Navajo gods in the rising waters of
Lake Powell. 18 Next, in Wilson v. Block,19 the Hopi Tribe and Navajo
Medicinemen's Association attempted to protect the sacred San Francisco
13. See, e.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 591-97 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in relevant part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Hopi
Indian Tribe v. Block, Nos. 81-0481, 81-0493, and 81-0558 (D.D.C. May 14, 1982), aff'd
sub nom, Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 611-12 (E.D. Tenn. 1979),
aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v.
Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 644-45 (D. Utah 1977), affd 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
See also United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 406-08 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming Forest
Service denial of special use permit to group of Sioux Indians for use of Black Hills
National Forest for religious purposes); Inupiat Cmty. of the Arctic Slope v. United States,
548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D. Ark. 1982) (rejecting claim that offshore mineral exploration
and development affected religious interests); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 793 (D.
S.D. 1982) (rejecting challenge by Lakota and Tsistsistas Nations to state action interfering
with religious practices at Bear Butte State Park).
14. See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1160-61 (6th Cir.
1980).
15. See id.
16. See id. at 1163 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972)).
17. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
18. See id. at 175-76.
19. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Peaks, located on national forest lands, from development as a ski area. 20
These cases culminated in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n,21 where Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians sought to stop the
building of a forest service road through their sacred "High Country,"
located on national forest lands.
22
These cases have been well-treated in legal scholarship, and I will not
discuss them in detail here.23 The relevant point is that the Indians lost in
every one. 24 In Lyng, for example, the Court recognized that government
action would "virtually destroy" the Indian religion, but held that the
development plan did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it would
not coerce belief and because the government's interest in developing its
land trumped any Indian religious claim.
25
As scholars have pointed out, the tribes often lose because the federal
courts do not understand Native religions. 26 Much of the jurisprudence
appears to be grounded in a worldview that separates land from religion,
history from spirituality, and belief from practice. These distinctions, such
as the land/religion distinction, may be meaningful in Judeo-Christian
religions:
Those traditions ... emphasize the idea of an individual relationship
with God developed as part of a religious community.... In the absence
of coerced conformity, adherents to such traditions are free to practice
their religions wherever they wish. For example, although specific
places have deep religious significance to both Jews and Christians, it is
generally assumed to be possible to practice these religions anywhere.
27
20. See id. at 737-38.
21. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
22. See id. at 442-43.
23. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise
Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 823-33 (1997). See generally BRIAN EDWARD BROWN,
RELIGION, LAW, AND THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
SACRED LAND (1999).
24. See BROWN, supra note 23, at 1-7.
25. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-53.
26. See, e.g., Lloyd Burton & David Ruppert, Bear's Lodge or Devils Tower: Inter-
cultural Relations, Legal Pluralism, and the Management of Sacred Sites on Public Lands, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 201, 204-05 (1999).
27. Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion In Federal Indian Law. The
Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1832
(1990):
What would you have to believe to think that there is no coercion involved in
forcibly desecrating sacred lands? You would have to believe (1) that physical
places are not central to religious practice; (2) that forcible removal of a person
2003]
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But unlike Judeo-Christian religions, tribal religions often are
inextricably tied to particular places in the natural world and cannot be
relocated. z Cherokee plaintiffs made this point in the Sequoyah litigation,
stating:
When this place is destroyed, the Cherokee people cease to exist as a
people .... The white man has taken nearly everything away from us,
our heritage, culture, traditions, and our way of life that is our
religion ... and I'm afraid of what will become of us and our children if
we allow the TVA to cover our sacred land with water .... [A]s the
water backs over the once Cherokee land, our people will feel a great
pain. The earth will cry ... as water covers this beautiful, fruitful valley,
members of our tribe will be in silence .... 29
When the Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment did not offer the
Cherokees any protection in this case, 30 one can only assume that cultural
barriers prevented the judges from understanding what "freedom of
religion" would mean in a Cherokee context.
The cultural and religious issues are both important and complex but, for
my present argument, I am most interested in how property law loses the
case for the tribes. In Lyng, for example, the Supreme Court was
particularly concerned about the Indians' claim that they needed
"undisturbed naturalness" to practice their religion in the sacred High
Country, located within the national forest. 3 1 In the Court's view, this claim
challenged the federal government's right to use the land according to its
protesting desecration of a sacred place is not religious coercion; (3) that
alteration by human beings of natural spaces is not an intrusion on religion; (4)
that religion is not connected to a place and can be practiced anywhere; (5).that
religion is a set of beliefs and rituals and that coercion arises only when the state
requires forced avowals of belief or prohibits the practice of ritual. The concept of
coercion, as Justice O'Connor defined it here, embodies the perspective
underlying a particular set of monotheistic religious traditions ... particularly
Jewish and Christian traditions.... This conception of religion differs from those
that involve a spiritual world understood as both multiple and indissolubly linked
with particular aspects of nature. These religions are place specific. Most
members of American Indian nations who adhere to traditional beliefs understand
all aspects of nature as spiritual.
Id. at 1832-33.
28. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 460-61 (Brennan, J, dissenting). See generally DELORIA,
supra note 7.
29. See BROWN, supra note 23, at 15 (quoting the testimonies of Lloyd Sequoyah,
Emmalie Driver, Willie Walkingstick, and Lloyd C. Owle in the plaintiff's complaint,
Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980)) (alterations in original).
30. See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165.
31. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
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own plans. Justice O'Connor explained: "No disrespect for these practices
is implied when one notes that such beliefs could easily require de facto
beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property."
32
In reality, the Indians were not actually claiming ownership rights, such as
the right to exclude others. Instead, they requested that the federal
government manage its property in a way that would protect the "privacy
and solitude" necessary for Indian religious practices. 33 But the majority
held that the Indian position would require a "diminution of the
Government's property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian
religion." 34 While the Court speculated that Indians might have some
rights, "[w]hatever rights the Indians may have to use of the area, however,
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after
all, its land."
35
After Lyng, the outlook is bleak for tribal religious practitioners: they
seek access to, and protection of sacred sites on federal public lands
because their relationship to the land is strong and essential to their religion
and culture. Yet they lose every case in part because their relationship to
the land does not constitute "ownership" in the sense of having fee simple
title to the land. Thus, Lyng appears to serve as a potential bar to many
tribal free exercise claims involving sacred sites located on federally-
owned land.
A THEORETICAL RESPONSE TO THE OWNERSHIP BAR
Going forward, tribes need to confront the property law aspect of these
cases. 36 In particular, tribes must develop legal arguments that respond to
the notion that federal ownership trumps Indian religious freedoms in
32. Id.
33. See id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Compare id. at 453, with JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE
AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (2002) ("Suppose a
government action would not merely destroy a Catholic church, but also the place where an
alleged religious miracle occurred? Would such an action penalize religion?... Would the
Court describe enjoining the project to protect the free exercise rights of Catholics as a
subsidy to the religion?").
35. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. Compare with Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164 ("The district
court ... based its holding [dismissing the Cherokee's Free Exercise Clause Claim] on the
plaintiffs' lack of any property interest in the Tellico area.... While this is a factor to be
considered, we feel it should not be conclusive in view of the history of the Cherokee
expulsion from Southern Appalachia followed by the "Trail of Tears" to Oklahoma and the
unique nature of the plaintiffs' religion.").
36. Other scholars also have acknowledged the property law challenge presented by
Lyng. See Dussias, supra note 23, at 823-3 3; Kevin J. Worthen, Protecting the Sacred Sites
of Indigenous People in U.S. Courts: Reconciling Native American Religion and the Right
to Exclude, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 239 (2000). See generally BROWN, supra note 23.
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sacred sites cases. In his recent works, Professor Joseph Singer has
articulated theories of property law that may be helpful to tribes as they
confront this challenge.
Singer argues that contemporary law and society are heavily influenced
by an "ownership model" of property.38 In this model, owners enjoy
virtually unlimited rights to exclude, to transfer, to use, and to possess
property. 39 Accordingly, in Lyng, the question was framed as: which party
had rights to use the Forest Service land? As the owner, the government
was the entity with the rights; as the non-owners, the Indians had few, if
any, rights. The government wanted to develop its land, and its rights to do
so were superior to the Indians' claims for religious freedoms. Thus, Lyng
reflects the pervasive notion that owners "are free to use the[ir] property as
they wish," that owners have virtually unlimited rights to exclude, to
transfer, to use, and to possess property. 
40
Despite popular perceptions, however, a deeper examination reveals that
the rights of owners are neither exclusive nor absolute. 41 In fact, owners'
rights are limited by owners' obligations to other people and to society.
42
As a result, non-owners may have protectable interests in property--even
while the owner maintains her rights to the property. Professor Singer
outlines several examples.43 A landlord's right to use his property can be
limited by common law, statutes, and the terms of a lease with a tenant.
The tenant has rights to enjoy a habitable apartment, to receive visitors, and
to be secure from eviction during the term of his lease. The landlord retains
37. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE
OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2000) [hereinafter, "THE EDGES"]; ENTITLEMENT, supra note 3.
Professors Angela Riley and Rebecca Tsosie have already considered Singer's social
relations and entitlement theories in the context of Indian law issues. See generally Angela
R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49
(2002); Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty
and Property in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291 (2001).
38. See ENTITLEMENT, supra note 3, at 3.
39. See id. at 2-3.
40. Id. at 2.
41. See id. at 30 (images popularly associated with property include a "single owner
with consolidated rights;" a "title" that provides clear criteria and designation of the owner
and her rights; "historical entitlement" as depending only on the moment of creation and
transfer; "boundaries" delineating the space where an owner enjoys his "absolute powers" to
use and possess, transfer, and exclude; ownership as involving "control of things;" property
as comprised of "many owners" whose uses are "self-regarding;" and "harm" to others as
the only legitimate reasoning for limiting one's ownership rights).
42. See id. at 3.
43. The examples provided in this section are drawn from ENTITLEMENT, supra note 3,
at 19-94 and THE EDGES, supra note 37, at 7-17.
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her right to take possession of the property at the end of the lease. A
shopping mall owner's right to exclude patrons perceived as undesirable
may be limited by laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race. In
some instances, the limitations on ownership may not be strictly legal.
Even in the absence of a union contract, for example, a factory owner's
right to close the factory may be limited by moral obligations to support
workers and the larger community.44 Underlying these legal and moral
limits on the rights of ownership include important societal values, such as
racial equality, providing people with security in their homes, and human
decency.
These examples, and others, 45 suggest that property is not just about
protecting the owner's rights. Instead, property is better conceptualized
through an "entitlement model" that recognizes "the conflicting interests of
everyone with legitimate claims to rights in the property in question."
4 6
Once we accept that the law should acknowledge the interests of owners
and certain non-owners, we can then turn to normative questions about the
recognition and distribution of entitlements 47-- or deciding what the law
should be. Here, Singer urges decision-makers to pay attention to the way
property structures "social relations." 48  In many contexts, from
condominium governance to informal agreements between neighbors to
city ordinances regarding the homeless, property rules structure
relationships between people by setting expectations, imposing obligations,
and affecting power distribution. In all of these settings, the justification of
any property right depends on the way in which it shapes relationships
among people and expresses human values.
49
Thus, in property law generally, ownership is just one aspect of the
analysis; and the same should be true in Indian sacred sites cases. Both the
federal government, as owner, and the Indians, as non-owners, have rights
44. See ENTITLEMENT, supra note 3, at 38-39.
45. Another example might come from the intellectual property field. Federal law
grants copyright owners the exclusive right to copy, distribute, perform, or display their
works, but it limits these protections to a time period (life of the author plus seventy years),
after which the work enters the public domain. The copyright statute thus balances
competing public policy values. On the one hand, it fosters invention and authors' creativity,
while on the other hand, it promotes the free exchange of ideas and marketability of
intellectual property. It accomplishes these goals by simultaneously protecting and limiting
owners' rights and recognizing the public's interests. See U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 8; 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
46. ENTITLEMENT, supra note 3, at 91.
47. See id. at 92.
48. See generally id. at 95-139.
49. THE EDGES, supra note 37, at 21.
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and obligations to sacred sites.50 Moreover, the important questions may
not be answered by arguing about either party's rights, 51 but rather by
looking deeply at societal values regarding religious and cultural freedoms,
and asking how the federal government and Indian nations wish to relate to
one another on the sacred lands that they now share.
52
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS AND ENTITLEMENT
THEORY
Following the classic property law model, the Supreme Court in Lyng
held that the non-owner Indians had no interest that could limit the
government's rights as owner.53 This focus may have obscured several
arguments in favor of Indian interests and federal obligations in sacred
sites, including claims based on common law property doctrine, treaty
rights, and the federal-Indian trust relationship.54 Looking forward to future
cases, I briefly outline these arguments in a general context, recognizing
that their utility in any particular sacred site dispute will depend
significantly on the facts.
50. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (recognizing that the government
and Indian nations are both owners and sovereigns).
51. See Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative
Approach to Cultural Conflict Over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 759 (2001) ("[W]e need to recognize [sacred sites] disputes as
cultural conflicts between communities, arising from a clash between master stories, which
inform the identity and understanding of the peoples who are the parties to these disputes,
rather than simply as disputes involving conflict between individual rights and government
power.").
52. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 26, at 204, 238-40.
53. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452-53
(1988).
54. Certain arguments based on the trust relationship were raised in Lyng. The Hoopa
parties claimed that the Forest Service's decision to build a road on certain National Forest
Lands and its proposed timber management plan would violate water and fishing rights
reserved to the Tribe when its reservation was created-as well as violate the government's
trust duties to protect those rights. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 605 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The district court accepted these
arguments, holding that the proposed projects would adversely affect water quality and the
fish habitat on the Hoopa Reservation, and would thereby violate the government's trust
duties. See id. The Ninth Circuit held that the Hoopa Tribe was not a party to the litigation
and vacated this portion of the district court holding. See Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 697 n.10 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court
did not further comment on the merits of this claim. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 444. The trust
argument was thus framed narrowly and quickly dismissed by the courts. None of the Lyng
opinions considered whether the trust responsibility, treaties, common law property, or any
other source of law, could establish tribal property rights or limit the near-absolute right of
the government over its land.
[Vol. 37:3
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First, tribes could examine whether there is any common law property
doctrine that might help them overcome the hurdle of Lyng.55 The common
law has long recognized that non-owners may have certain rights as against
title holders; these include, but are not limited to, rights established by
adverse possession, easements, and covenants. At least one tribe has
successfully used common law property arguments to establish a limited
entitlement to lands owned by a third party that were necessary for a tribal
religious practice. In U.S. v. Platt, the Zuni Tribe sought access to a path
located on private lands and necessary for its pilgrimage from the
reservation in New Mexico to Zuni Heaven in Arizona-a 1 10-mile trek
which sixty religious leaders had been making on horseback and foot every
four years since at least 1540.56 The Tribe, cognizant of the limitations
imposed by Lyng, sued for a prescriptive easement instead of seeking relief
under the First Amendment. 57 Finding that the Tribe's use of the path
demonstrated actual, open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use
for the statutory period, the court granted a prescriptive easement to use the
path for the pilgrimage to Zuni Heaven once every four years. 58 Following
the Zunis' example in Platt, tribes should evaluate closely the various
common law property claims available to them. In Platt, for example, the
Zunis could frame their case under Arizona's law of prescription because
they were suing a private defendant, but generally such claims are not
actionable against the federal government. 9 Other common law claims
may be appropriate depending on the facts of a particular case.
60
Second, tribes could re-examine treaties to determine whether they
contain residual rights to sacred sites.61 Under the reserved rights doctrine,
tribes retain any rights that have not been ceded in treaty language or
divested by statute.6 2 Moreover, the Indian canons of construction provide
55. See Worthen, supra note 36, at 248.
56. See United States ex rel. Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318 (1990).
57. See Hank Meshorer, The Sacred Trail to Zuni Heaven: A Study in the Law of
Prescriptive Easements, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 319-20 (Jo Carillo ed.,
1998).
58. See id. at 323-24.
59. But see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES
221 (3d ed. 2002) (in some jurisdictions, property law is becoming more amenable to
adverse possession claims against governments).
60. See, e.g., Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 308-09 (Alaska 1990)
(holding Alaska Native claimants satisfied the elements of adverse possession through their
use of certain lands for subsistence and recreational purposes).
61. See Robert Charles Ward, The Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the Desecration and
Destruction of Native American Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 822-
23 (1992); Worthen, supra note 36, at 251.
62. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 401-
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that treaties must be read liberally in favor of the Indians, as they would
have understood them, with ambiguous provisions resolved in favor of the
Indians. 63 In the recent case of Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, the Supreme Court applied the reserved rights doctrine and the
Indian canons to uphold tribal hunting rights in traditional territories, even
where the tribe had relinquished title to those lands by treaty.64 An
analogous argument may have potential in the sacred site context: where a
treaty conveyed to the government fee simple title to lands encompassing
Indian sacred sites but did not explicitly divest tribal practitioners of the
rights to use those sites, the treaty should be interpreted as preserving the
tribal religious use. Potential limitations to this approach include that the
Supreme Court has applied the Indian canons with decreasing frequency in
recent cases 65 and many of the treaties were signed during the period when
the government was actively suppressing tribal religions.66 Depending on
the particular treaty language, however, Indians may be able to establish
reserved treaty rights to access and use of sacred sites.
Third, tribes could argue the federal government has a duty to protect
sacred sites under the federal-Indian trust doctrine. The trust doctrine
provides that, as a result of dealings between the United States and Indian
nations, the government assumed a fiduciary duty toward Indian peoples,
02 (1993) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552-53 (1832); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-82
(1905)).
63. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 74 (1999) (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1970);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)). See generally
Frickey, supra note 62; Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of
Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" -
How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
64. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 195-202
(1999). See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (treaty-
guaranteed hunting and fishing rights survived the Termination Act's extension of state law
to former reservation lands); Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal
Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279,
284 (2000) (arguing that tribes not only have reserved rights to hunt and fish off-reservation
but also to participate in land management decisions affecting off-reservation habitats).
65. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit Of
States'Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267-68
(2001).
66. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (stating that
"past federal policy was to assimilate American Indians into United States culture, in part by
deliberately suppressing, and even destroying, traditional tribal religions and culture in the
19th and early 20th centuries").
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their lands, and other assets.67 This duty has been interpreted to reuire
federal protection of Indians' natural resources against other threats. 8 In
the context of sacred sites located on federally-owned lands, however, this
argument may be somewhat difficult to make69 because these lands are, by
definition, not held by the government "in trust" for tribes. 70 But a broader
view of the trust relationship suggests that it applies in most dealings
between the government and Indian nations,71 including the protection of
67. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (Mitchell 11); Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1942); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
68. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native
Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and
Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109.
69. Federal courts have rejected trust responsibility claims even where sacred sites are
located on tribal lands. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 980
F.Supp. 448, 460-63 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that federal officials' decision not to take
action to prevent flooding of tribal lands, including lands where the Tribe grew corn for the
religious Green Corn ceremony, did not violate the trust responsibility and other laws). In
denying the Tribes' claims for a writ of mandamus and damages on a breach of trust theory,
Miccosukee held that "despite the general trust obligation of the United States to Native
Americans, the government assumes no specific duties to Indian tribes beyond those found
in applicable statutes, regulations, treaties or other agreements." Id. at 461 (citing Mitchell H
and the Tucker Act). This holding may conflate requirements for breach of trust claims
under two separate lines of cases. The Supreme Court has held that the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1505, requires an affirmative legal basis, separate from the Tucker Act
itself, to support an award of damages for breach of federal trust duties to Indians in suits
brought in the Court of Federal Claims. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 123 S. Ct.
1079, 1091 (2003); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (Mitchell 1); United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983) (Mitchell I1). However, scholars have argued
that this standard does not apply outside of the Tucker Act context, such as in cases where
tribes sue administrative agencies for equitable relief under the Administrative Procedure
Act on grounds that an agency action unlawfully violated common law trust duties to tribes.
See Mary Christina Wood, Origins & Development of the Trust Responsibility: Paternalism
or Protection?, Remarks at the Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference (April 10,
2003) (on file with the author) (citing Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354
F. Supp. 252, 256-57 (D.D.C. 1972) and numerous other federal cases holding that
agencies' breach of trust duties supports equitable remedies); Mary Christina Wood, Indian
Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 1471, 1521-22. See generally Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975) (courts should
enforce federal trust obligations to American Indians through traditional common law
equitable remedies).
70. Compare United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123 S. Ct. 1126, 1133
(2003) (the "fact that the property occupied by the United States is expressly subject to a
trust supports a fair inference that an obligation to preserve the property improvements was
incumbent on the [Government] as trustee," in a case for damages under the Tucker Act).
71. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual
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sacred sites on public lands. 72
In sacred sites claims, then, Indian nations may be able to rely on
common law property, treaty rights, and the federal-Indian trust doctrine to
challenge the notion that federal ownership trumps Indian interests in
sacred sites. This is only a partial list. Indian nations might also consider
developing arguments based on international law's increasing protection
for indigenous property rights73 and tribes' own laws and customs on
sacred sites.
74
Finally, in some cases Indians may be unsuccessful in establishing tribal
rights or federal obligations at federally-owned sacred sites; however they
should still not face the destruction of their religion. Even where the federal
government arguably has the legal "right" to destroy a tribal religion, it is
not required to exercise that right. Consistent with the values underlying
the First Amendment and citizens' expectations of religious freedom and
tolerance, the federal government accommodates many mainstream
religious practices. 75 It should do the same for Indian religions, within the
parameters of the Establishment Clause. 76 Indeed, current federal policy
Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 210-11 (2000)
(The trust relationship is "grounded ... in a number of sources, including treaties, laws of
Congress, and judicial rulings" giving rise to a "duty 'to protect and enhance the people, the
property, and the self-government of Indian tribes."') (quoting the AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 95TH CONG., FINAL REPORT TASK FORCE No. 9, at 39 (Comm.
Print 1977)). This broad view is consistent with both indigenous understandings of the trust
relationship, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW & PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997), and international law on states' duties
to indigenous peoples, see S. James Anaya, International Law and the United States' Trust
Responsibility Toward Native Americans, in NATIVE VOICES: AMERICAN INDIAN IDENTITY
AND RESISTANCE, (forthcoming June 2003).
72. See generally, Jeri Beth K. Ezra, The Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for
Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 705 (1989); Ward, supra note 61, at 82 1.
73. See Riley, supra note 37, at 78-83 (discussing The Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous
Cmty. of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Case No. 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2001)). See generally
S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights
over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001).
74. See, e.g., Laurie Anne Whitt, et al., Belonging to Land: Indigenous Knowledge
Systems and the Natural World, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 701, 722 (200 1).
75. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (citing numerous examples of federal
accommodation of religion, the Supreme Court ruled that a nativity scene on city property
did not violate the Establishment Clause, even though it had religious significance to
Christians).
76. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F.Supp.2d 1448, 1454 (D. Wyo.
1998) (applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) where the Supreme Court ruled
that a governmental action does not offend the Establishment Clause if it (1) has a secular
purpose, (2) does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
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directs executive agencies to accommodate tribal religious practices on
federal public lands.77 Agencies have successfully implemented this policy,
as in the National Park Service's development of a management plan for
Devils Tower National Monument that accommodated Indian ceremonial
practices, while also recognizing the interests of rock climbers and visitors
to Devils Tower. The management plan survived Establishment Clause
challenges and was upheld by the Tenth Circuit in Bear Lodge Multiple
Use Ass 'n. v. Babbitt.78 The legislative branch, too, has an important role in
recognizing tribal rights to federally-owned sacred sites, as evidenced in
recent federal legislation settling a dispute over Sandia Mountain in New
Mexico. This settlement simultaneously confirms ongoing federal
ownership, the public's interest in access, and tribal rights to use the land
for religious purposes and participate in decision making regarding the
land.79
CONCLUSION
Lyng suggests that Indians are likely to lose Free Exercise Clause claims
involving sacred sites located on lands owned by the federal government.
Yet Indian religious practitioners and their advocates can develop legal
arguments that respond to Lyng's "ownership bar." Property law can be
used to support Indian rights and federal obligations in sacred sites, even in
cases of federal ownership. In a subsequent article, I will develop and
substantiate these property-based arguments, and evaluate their potential
efficacy in contexts such as litigation, legislation, and the administrative
process. But this preliminary analysis suggests that a more expansive
approach to property law can help both Indian nations and the federal
government to approach sacred sites cases in a way that reflects common
values in favor of religious freedoms.
religion, and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion). See also Zellmer,
supra note 5, at 416 (discussing the appropriateness of accommodating American Indian
uses of sacred sites).
77. See Executive Order No. 13007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996). See
Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and the Uphill Battle Facing Native
American Religion on Public Lands, 20 LAW & INEQ. 157, 164-74 (2002) (discussing
federal statutes and other laws that offer protection to American Indian sacred sites).
78. 175 F.2d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing). See
also Burton & Ruppert, supra note 26 (offering a detailed discussion of Bear Lodge). In my
next article on this topic, I will focus on the administrative process as a potential forum for
tribes to use more expansive notions of property law in sacred sites cases.
79. See T'uf Shur Bien Preservation Trust Area Act of 2003, H.R. 222, 108th Cong.
(2003) (establishing the T'uf Shur Bien Preservation Trust Area within the Cibola National
Forest in the State of New Mexico in order to resolve a land claim involving the Sandia
Mountain Wilderness). See also Michael Coleman, Sandia Dispute Comes to an End,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12460652.
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